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BION AND SCHÖN: PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES ON
REFLECTION IN ACTION
by JOSEPH MINTZ, University College London
ABSTRACT: Schön’s concept of ‘reflection in action’, particularly when
5interpreted from a sociocultural perspective, is often used as frame with
which to consider the relationship between theoretical and tacit knowledge
in the work of teachers. This paper presents an alternative interpretative
frame for Schön which makes use of the ideas of Wilfred Bion, perhaps the
most influential psychoanalyst of the second half of the twentieth century. It
10is argued that it is the productive emotional struggle with uncertainty that
lies within Schön’s moment, which ultimately leads to the teacher coming to
a moment of decision about what the child might need in a particular
situation. This (contingent) understanding arises from a dialectic intertwin-
ing of knowledge derived from intersubjective relationship and theoretical
15knowledge, for example, about typical and atypical development in children.
Implications for professional practice particularly in relation to working
with children with special educational needs are discussed.
Keywords: psychoanalysis, Schön, Bion, reflection in action, special educa-
tional needs
201. PROBLEMATIZING SCHÖN
Schön (1983) emphasized the importance for professionals of tacit/experiential as
well as theoretical knowledge. His concept of ‘reflection in action’ is based on
the premise that all professionals make use of a combination of both types of
knowledge when working ‘in the moment’ on solving professional problems. My
25focus in this paper is on Schön’s consideration of what goes on ‘in the moment’.
My contention is that in Schön’s work, as in the work of many of his
commentators, this consideration is both under theorized and under exploited,
particularly for professionals working in the caring services. I propose to make
use of a psychoanalytic lens based on Wilfred Bion’s epistemology of how
30knowledge arises in the intersubjective relationship between two people. Bion
was one of the great psychoanalytic theorists of the  twentieth century, who
developed (or perhaps revolutionized) the ideas of Melanie Klein and the object
relations approach in psychoanalysis. His ideas continue to have a pervasive
influence on psychoanalytic thinking. His intersubjective quasi-Kantian episte-
35mology, can, I propose, serve to illuminate what goes on in that ‘uncertain
moment’ when teachers, and indeed other caring professionals, come to deci-
sions about how to work with children. In particular, a Bionion lens suggests that
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there is something inherently uncertain in the ‘moment’ when teachers relate
intersubjectively to their children, and that this uncertainty is a crucial part of, or
40even defines, the process of coming to know, in a truly useful sense, about the
child.
Although Bion mainly directed this mode of thinking to analysts, many of his
writings, particularly Attention and Interpretation (Bion, 1970), have a much
wider scope, and my project here is to consider how his message is relevant to
45teachers as well as other members of the community of caring professionals.
2. ABOUT UNCERTAINTY
Schön’s outline of the concept of reflection in action, whereby professionals
combine tacit and theoretical knowledge in the moment, implies the presence of
uncertainty in the process of teacher thinking and decision making. Polanyi
50(1958), Schön’s theoretical predecessor, conceptualized the space between the
rules and the performance as equivalent to tacit knowledge. We can conceive of
uncertainty, as inhabiting this space between the rules and a performance, which
a professional must perforce traverse, whether consciously or unconsciously, in
coming to a decision.
55Conceived of in this way, uncertainty is an aspect of the work of all teachers
and indeed all professionals. However, it has a particular application to the work
of children with special educational needs (SENs), because such children often
have diagnostic categories applied to them that come with associated cognitive
accounts and bodies of expert knowledge. This leads to potential uncertainty
60about how to make use of this expert knowledge and brings more explicitly to
the fore the question of how this is balanced with their on going experiential or
tacit knowledge gained from working with other similar children or from work-
ing with the same child over time. Furthermore, the area of SEN and how to
achieve effective inclusion is positioned at the intersection of theoretical and
65policy debates about agency versus capability, as well as, in Barton’s (1988)
terms, sociological versus psychological conceptualizations of special needs and
special education. Such debates, particularly in regard to the role of science in
determining what we know about a child through the use of diagnostic labels (i.e.
expert knowledge), penetrate deeply in to the classroom and provoke further
70uncertainty when the teacher considers how to work with children with the
label SEN.
3. PRODUCTIVE UNCERTAINTY
It is of course the case that certain domains within the human sciences, including
communications research and cognitive approaches to professional stress, have posi-
75tioned uncertainty as a clear negative. Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) influential
uncertainty reduction theory posited that during social interaction, high levels of
uncertainty tend to reduce levels of communication and thus the potential for learning.
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This reflects to some extent the common sense view that uncertainty is undesirable,
and that the more we can achieve certainty, or its close correlate expertise, the more
80effective we will be. In teaching, this might be seen in the common occurrence, as
Hargreaves (1994) identifies, of feelings of guilt, failure, or lack of confidence in their
professional abilities when teachers experience uncertainty.
Others have taken a more balanced approach to thinking about uncertainty.
Helsing (2007), Wasserman (1993) and indeed the broader movement using
85concepts influenced by or derived from Schön’s idea of the reflective practitioner
as a lens for thinking about professional development (Brookfield, 1995; Kolb,
1984; Moon, 1999) suggest that it is only by engaging with uncertainty, by
identifying critical incidents that are at least initially unclear to the professional,
that professional development can come about. However, I argue that such
90conceptualizations of uncertainty tend to give primacy to the move from uncer-
tainty to expertise, and thus implicitly undervalue what can be gained from an
ongoing state of uncertainty.
My contention is it is through the ongoing grappling with uncertainty that the
teacher comes to know the child more fully. The uncertainty is productive. This
95conceptualization of uncertainty is based on Bion’s psychoanalytic epistemology.
In this it has some significant similarities to  Britzman’s (1998, 2013) use of
Bion’s conceptualization of uncertainty in the teaching situation. However,
Britzman both assumes Bion’s epistemology and leaves its relationship to other
frames for thinking about professional practice and development largely
100untouched. Here I go further, in fact I would argue much further, in working
out how productive uncertainty relates to the theoretical and professional discus-
sion about what might be meant when Schön and Polanyi refer to a space
between expert and tacit or experiential knowledge. I develop my argument
based on the premise that this space has a particular quality that is to do with
105both relationship and agency, and that this is of particular relevance for profes-
sionals working in the caring services such as teachers. Although the vast
majority of occupations involved interaction with others, it is reasonable to
propose that in the caring professions, there is a particular intensity about the
relationship between teacher and child, or nurse and patient, or social worker and
110client. The problems that these professionals are faced with are problems about
people, and the uncertainties that they experience involve to a significant extent
the human mind, certainly an embodied mind, but nevertheless a complex mind
that they can only come to know through relationship. Bion (1962) formulates
the term ‘learning from experience’, by which he means a particular type of
115learning, in which we come to know, or even, in his epistemology, to have
thoughts, through the relationship that we have with others, starting with our
earliest relationship with our primary caregiver. The analyst, and Bion’s focus
was primarily on the work of the psychoanalyst, comes to learn about the patient,
to know them, through their ongoing intersubjective relationship with them. This
120process is not, in Bion’s worldview, an easy one. It is fraught with difficulty, with
uncertainty. This can be illuminated with a vignette from my own experience.
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4. AVI
It was my fifth year as a teacher. I was teaching a Year 3 (ages 7 to 8) class.
They were a ‘nice’ class, many of whom were good natured and eager to learn,
125although the class was not without children who had particular difficulties and
needs. One of these was Avi. He was bilingual, coming from an Israeli family of
Iraqi origin. Although generally fluent in English, his reading and writing skills
were a bit behind those of his classmates. He was quite a sparky child, often
pleasant and enthusiastic, but who was also quite emotionally immature for his
130age. He would quite frequently, and often for no clearly obvious reason, get quite
strongly upset in class. He would screw up his face, sometimes stamp his feet,
and quite frequently burst in to tears. Usually during these episodes, if given
some attention, and left for a while, he tended to calm down. He also had a
tendency to be quite clingy, and developed a strong attachment to me as his
135teacher over the course of the year. One interaction with him, eight years ago
now at the time of writing, has stuck very strongly in my memory. There was a
whole school activity taking place – a dreidel competition. Dreidels are four
sided spinning tops with a particular letter on each side, that are used for a
game associated with the Jewish festival of Chanukah. Two classes together were
140given a time to work in the hall on making dreidels and to practice spinning
them. During our time in the hall, most of the children were getting on fine with
their dreidels, but Avi was finding it hard. I can’t remember the precise problem
he was having – it might have been in getting his dreidel to spin properly. He
was quite frustrated by this and starting to get upset. I do remember quite
145strongly noticing this from across the room and coming to work with him. I
made some suggestions as to what he might do. He looked up at me, but didn’t
take any notice of what I had said, and carried on not managing the task. I
remember having a strong feeling, and it was more of a feeling than a precise
thought, that what he needed was just for me to be there with him and not
150necessarily to say anything. I also remember that it was quite an effort to
concentrate on him the hall was very noisy and there was lots of movement
from excited children and spinning dreidels. But I managed to do just that,
crouching down near him, watching him use the dreidel. On the surface he
didn’t seem obviously to react to me in any particularly strong way, although he
155glanced momentarily up at me every so often. But I had a strong sense of
communicating with him in some way, of being alert to what he needed, and
of it being somehow important for me to be there and alert with him, even though
I didn’t have anything specific to say or do. He just carried on playing with the
dreidel, noticeably more calmly now, glancing up at me every so often.AQ1
160This vignette was derived using a psychodynamically informed psychosocial
methodology, derived from the Tavistock infant observation model (see Mintz,
2014), which make use of the observer’s emotional state in understanding a
social field. This is equivalent to the psychoanalytic process of counter-
transference, which involves the observer in being sensitive to the unconscious
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165communication taking place between them and the subject. The vignette illumi-
nates how this occurs in an intersubjective encounter, which can act as way of
coming to know the child. I report my emotional state, and how that, in some
way, was a bellwether for what was going on for Avi or what it might be that he
needed at that particular moment. In this case, the conclusion that I drew after
170this incident, based on my observation if you will of my own emotional state, is
that it was difficult for me to ‘stick’ with Avi and his possibly quite hard work
with the dreidels. I identify difficulty with concentrating on Avi in the bustling
hall, but part of this difficulty may also have been that of engaging with ‘not
knowing’, of being in a state of uncertainty about what it was that Avi needed. It
175would have been much easier to dive in quickly and help Avi with the dreidel, or
to offer him advice about what he should be doing – much easier than staying
with the difficult task of being uncertain, and of entering in to intersubjective
relationship with him.
Similarly, the therapist, and as I argue, in parallel, the teacher, must shy
180away from the easy temptation of rushing to quick certainties, but rather
grapple with the pain of ‘not knowing’, of being uncertain, and wait expec-
tantly for the (still contingent) knowledge that arises through the intersubjec-
tive encounter.
It should be noted that I use the term intersubjective as it is employed by
185Daniel Stern, i.e. to mean an agentic self which can is aware both of itself and its
differentiation to others, and which can be awareAQ2 of and be in relationship with
other minds (Stern, 1985AQ3 ). Bion’s epistemology sets out a very particular view on
how that relationship to other minds comes about, but one which I think is
compatible with and comes within the broad use of Stern’s use of the term which
190emphasizes the individual’s conscious and unconscious mind in encounter with
other minds. Stern’s usage in particular can be contrasted to other uses of the
term – first those such as Henriques and Hollway (1988)AQ4 , who employ a
hermeneutic or Lacanian approach to its definition, and second those such as
Aitken and Trevathen (1997), who employ a largely cognitive approach which
195minimizes the role of emotion and the dynamic unconscious in defining how
minds meet.
5. ISSUES WITH SCHÖN
Schön (1983) highlights the limitations of technical rationality when applied to
professional practice, illuminating in particular the failure of the technical
200rational model to resolve the tension between theoretical knowledge and tacit
or experiential knowledge in the practical application of knowledge in profes-
sional practice. His approach to resolving this tension is to propose a new
paradigm, ‘Reflection-in-Action’, in which theoretical knowledge co-exists, in
some rather ill-defined way, with tacit practice-based knowledge. Schön char-
205acterizes this idea of ‘Reflection-in-Action’ through the use of various examples,
such as that of the tight rope walker:
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[…] the know-how is in the action […] a tight-rope walker’s know-how, for
example, lies in, and is revealed, by the way he takes his trip across the wire, or
that a big-league pitcher’s know-how is in his way of pitching to a batter’s
210weakness, changing his pace, or distributing his energies over the course of a
game […]
(Schön, 1983, pp. 50–51)
Schön tries to elaborate the idea of the ‘know-how is in the action’ by referring
to how such professionals talk about this. So he describes how pitchers talk about
215‘finding the groove’ or how jazz musicians talk about ‘having a feel for’ their
material when improvising.
Thus Schön’s concept of ‘reflection in action’ is based on the premise that all
professionals make use of a combination of theoretical and tacit or experiential
knowledge when working ‘in the moment’ on solving professional problems. Yet
220what this actually means, as in the description of the tight-rope walker is
typically unclear. In solving the riddle, a number of theorists such as Kemmis
(2005) and Erlandson and Beach (2008), treat Schön as something of a closet
cognitivist, making sense of ‘in the moment’ by more clearly positioning it as a
socio-cultural expression of praxis, whereby activity/experience and meaning/
225knowledge are mutually constitutive. I propose another way of interpreting
Schön. My contention is that applying a psychoanalytic lens, particularly one
based on Bion’s epistemology of how knowledge arises in the intersubjective
relationship between two people, can, for caring professionals, give a different,
and potentially useful, characterization of what goes on in ‘uncertain moments’
230when teachers engage in practice in the classroom. In addition, a Bionion lens
suggests that there is something inherently uncertain in ‘the moment’ when
caring professionals relate intersubjectively to their clients, and that this ongoing
process of uncertainty equates with the process of coming to know, in a truly
useful sense, about the client or the child as a truly autonomous if ultimately
235fully unknowable person.
6. BION’S EPISTEMOLOGY
Bion (1962) formulation of the term ‘learning from experience’ refers to a
particular type of learning, in which we come to know, or even to have thoughts,
through the relationship that we have with others, starting with our earliest
240relationship with our primary caregiver. This process is fraught with the diffi-
culty of staying with the experience of uncertainty. Those wishing to ‘learn from
experience’ need to shy away from the easy temptation of rushing to quick
certainties, just as I might have wanted to ‘jump in’ and help Avi with the
dreidel.
245Bion (1962) developed his system of epistemology based on Klein, propos-
ing that the process of coming to know depends on the development of the
ability to tolerate the frustration of uncertainty – of ‘not knowing’. Klein (1923)AQ5
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theorized that for the infant to experience the good, loving mother as also
possibly hateful was overwhelming, and that instead, in phantasy (unconscious
250imagination), the infant would ‘split’ the mother in to a good loving mother and a
bad persecutory mother. This process of splitting becomes a fundamental process
of the unconscious mind. Klein denotes the mind, in the process of defensive
splitting of aspects of the world in to idealized good and hateful persecutory bad
parts as being in the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ position, which can alternate with the
255‘depressive position’ in which guilt leads to reparation and reconciliation.
In Learning from Experience (Bion, 1962), he proposes that it is the growing
toleration of frustration signified by the development of the depressive position
that allows ‘thinking’ to develop. Thinking and/or thoughts are what happens in
the space where the infant can tolerate the non-appearance of the breast or other
260part-object, as opposed to evacuating it in paranoid-schizoid mode. For Bion, the
process of thinking and learning is rooted in the developing ability of humans to
tolerate uncertainty and ‘unknowing’. As such, relationship is at the centre of
Bion’s epistemology. Bion also extends Klein’s concept of project identification.
Linked to her theoretical development on splitting, Klein posits that in phantasy
265the infant splits off parts of the self that are felt to be negative or hateful. These
split off parts are then projected out on to an external person. There is then an
unconscious identification to this split of element of the self-residing in this
external person. This may be associated with unconscious evocative behaviour
designed to make the recipient of the projection behave in accordanceAQ6 with the
270projective phantasy. For Klein, this was a defensive mechanism, but Bion
reframed it as a normal process of communication from the baby to the mother,
in which the mother can process the baby’s unformed anxieties with her free-
floating benign attention (reverie). For Bion, this unconscious pattern of com-
munication is the central driver of how the baby comes to think. Bion (1962,
275p. 91) suggests that the baby has a pre-conception (an instinctual thought in its
first instantiation) of the mother’s breast. When the breast is absent, so that this
pre-conception cannot be realized, the baby feels that it is going to die. In normal
development, according to Bion, the baby uses projective identification to com-
municate with the mother. In this case, the baby cries, with the intention of
280provoking in the mother the same feelings that the baby is having, i.e. ‘I’m going
to die’, thus projecting its feelings of annihilation in to the mother. The mother,
again in the course of normal development, uses her maternal reverie to process
these feelings. The mother can, in a process that at least initially occurs to a
significant extent in the unconscious, recognize the communication contained in
285the projection, and her response to this communication models for the baby that
such communication is real and possible. This establishes or represents a con-
stant pattern of communicative interaction between mother and baby. We can see
here in more detail Bion’s broadening of Klein’s idea of projective identification
as a pathological process to one of normal infantile intersubjective
290communication.
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Thus, the mother can both tolerate this projection of anxiety from the baby,
and can tolerate her frustration in not knowing what it is that the baby wants. In
this gap of toleration, thoughts arise and the mother then thinks, actually the baby
is not going to die and what it needs is a feed, or she investigates what the baby
295might need. The baby receives unconsciously this communication of ‘you are not
going to die’ back from the mother. The baby is then able itself to tolerate the
frustration of waiting for the breast. So when the baby then receives the breast,
its pre-conception is met with realization, leading to a conception. The initial
development of the thought of the breast becomes possible. For Bion, the
300development of thought is rooted in the ability to tolerate frustration, or to put
it another way, to be able to tolerate not knowing whether the breast will return.
Perhaps the next time the baby feels the absence of the breast, due its ability now
to begin to formulate the thought of the breast, it can wait a little longer before
the mother reacts and in that space where the baby is tolerating frustration it can
305think about what is not there. Thus, the baby can create a mental representation
of the absent breast, which is a thought.
Furthermore, Bion considers the formation of a conception to be part of an
ongoing cycle. He proposes that when a conception is formed, part of it remains
‘unsaturated’, i.e. part of its meaning or the understanding it represents is not
310fully formed. In this space of ‘not knowing’, the search for the next realization
and the formation of higher concepts can take place. In simpler terms, every
piece of understanding that we attain (and for Bion this framework is how
thinking and thoughts develop throughout life not just in infancy) has within it
the seeds of further questions which we go on to (painfully) explore.
315Bion extends this approach to the work of analyst and analysand. The analyst
thus serves as a container for the projected anxieties and pain of the analysand,
and allows ‘thinking’ to develop. Extending this further to other contexts such as
the classroom, as others including myself have done, teachers might, similarly to
the mother in infancy, act as a container for the child’s frustration extant in the
320process of learning, and thus allow ‘thinking’ to develop.
7. TRACING BION’S THINKING
Bion’s work can be split into two phases. The first phase of writing covers the
1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. Bion develops Klein’s ideas, introducing
in particular a theory of thinking, and approaches to practice for the
325psychoanalyst.
In this phase, Bion sees himself as being in search, perhaps similarly to
Freud, of a scientific approach to psychoanalysis.
There is a precise flavour to his writing which can be seen in his use of
innovative notations introduced in his theory of thinking and the use of mathe-
330matical notation in the Elements of Psycho-Analysis (1963), Attention and
Interpretation (1970), and Transformations (1965), to denote how the analyst
transforms what the analysand has been saying. Bion (1967)AQ7 uses the term
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transformation analogously to the idea of a mathematic transformation, where for
example a shape is transformed in size. Just as in the mathematical transforma-
335tion, when the analyst transforms what the analysand has presented, certain
invariants remain. For the shape, the ratio of the length of the sides is invariant,
whereas for the analyst-analysand, it may be something of the key emotional
content of what was said that remains invariant.
In the second phase of Bion’s writing, from the 1970s onwards, the influence
340of Kant on his thinking becomes more evident. Bion introduces the use of the
term ‘O’, which can be thought of representing the agentic core of the analysand,
in the sense of Kant’s noumena – the core that experiences the anxiety, and that
projects them out to analyst. This core is both in flux and inherently unknowable
in totality to the analyst. But it is through the process of unconscious commu-
345nication that it can be brought in to contact with and translated, albeit always
contingently, to conscious cognitive thought and verbal expression. This happens
first in the mind of the analyst in a process akin to that of maternal reverie, and
then through the relationship between them in the mind of the analysand.
Bion uses the terms ‘O’ and also the terminology ‘becomes’ in relation to the
350analysand in the same sense that Kant did in the ‘Copernican revolution’, namely
that the existence of a noumenic world is what implies the possibility of free will,
and of an agentic human subject who can choose what they ‘become’.
 I shall use the sign O to denote that which is the ultimate reality represented by
terms such as ultimate reality, absolute truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing in-
355itself .
(Bion, 1977, p. 27) 
Bion describes an unending dialectic between conscious and unconscious
thought, which is mediated through O. In the analytic session, the analyst’s task
is, as James Grotstein, who was an analysand of Bion and one of his significant
360commentators puts it, to:
 intuitively responsive to…his waveband of O, which then resonates with the
analysand’s psychoanalytic object, his own O, which is characterized by his
Ultimate Reality…. Thus the analyst’s O becomes resonant on that ineffable
 ‘waveband’ with the O of the analysand, which the former must then transduces
365or transform for the analysand…as symbols in the form of interpretation; if
accepted, it then becomes transformed into the analysand’s personal O .
(Grotstein, 2007, p. 117)
However, O is always in flux and there is an ongoing dialectic between
cognitive verbal ‘interpretations’ and the ineffable O, which never come to an
370end point, but continue in an iterative reflexive relationship. When this happens,
a pattern, picked up via this process of unconscious communication, emerges in
to the conscious mind of the analyst. Bion terms this the ‘selected fact’ (1967,
p. 48), a particular type of emotional knowledge of the other, whereby a ‘con-
stant conjunction’ of emotional communication becomes clear, or saturated
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375enough, that it can be given a tentative label by the conscious mind. Crucially
Bion saw these as involving the application of existing conscious psychoanalytic
theories such as the Oedipal Complex, but these theories are applied flexibly,
tentatively, to the particularities of the analysand as they are presented in the
consulting room. They become a new individual theory for that particular
380analysand, in the context of that particular encounter between a particular analyst
and analysand, always partly ‘unsaturated’, partly still unknown. Thus, the
process of engaging in uncertainty is always ongoing, always contingent on
what might be developing for the analysand in each new moment. For Bion,
this is a painful, difficult process for both parties. Going through the uncertainty
385of ‘not knowing’ the analysand, of foregoing the easier path of premature flight
in to the desire for certainty, for being able to say ‘yes, this is the analysand, this
is his category, this is his solution’, is difficult. Yet it is only in this way that the
analyst can truly come to know the analysand, and at the same time, through
tolerating the frustration of uncertainty, to facilitate the analysand truly coming to
390know himself. The patient in the process of ‘becoming comes to know his own
‘O’, his own inner self, through the facilitation of the analyst.
Grotstein (2007, p. 305) notes that Bion’s use of the term ‘become’ derives
from Plato’s idea of ‘that which is always becoming’. This applies to the analyst,
who through his reverie, the resonance of his ‘O’ with the ‘O’ of the analysand,
395‘becomes’ the analysand. This does not suggest a merger, but rather a deep
intersubjective meeting in relationship. At the same time, the analysand, through
the transformative experience of having his being recognized by another, is able
to come in to contact with his own ‘O’, and thus to ‘become’ himself.
8. EXPERIENTIAL AND THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE
400Bion’s stance represents another position from which we might interpret Schön
and think about professional practice based on a conception of relationships
between minds that is based on the ultimately unknowable noumenal reality of
the human subject, that somehow becomes (again partially and contingently)
known to the analyst through intersubjective encounter, an encounter in which
405the analysand is helped to ‘become’. In this alternative view of what Schön
might mean by ‘in the moment’, productive uncertainty refers to the meeting
point where one autonomous agentic person grapples with the difficulty of
coming to know the other, and through that difficult encounter facilitates the
growth of another autonomous agentic human subject.
410I argue that Bion’s quasi-mystical dialectic offers one way of interpreting
what Schön is trying to get at in his idea of Reflection-in-action, of conceptualiz-
ing the relationship between how theoretical and tacit knowledge intercalate ‘in
the moment’.
Let’s come back to the Schon’s tight rope walker example. As Schön
415intimates, if they sit on their unicycle, balancing on the rope, and start con-
sciously thinking, ‘Is the pole pushed too far out, did I check the rope properly?’,
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then we can guess what is likely to happen. If we re-interpret this in Bionion
terms, we could say that they need to suspend the desire for certainty based on
knowledge, and rely on their unconscious intuition. True, in this, the intuition is
420in relation to the manipulation of a physical object. The emergence of the
selected fact – ‘this is the time to move the pole up a few millimetres’, arises
based on the walker’s use of his free-floating attention in relation to the physical
task. Yet the walker still might have a body of theoretical knowledge about
tightrope walking – ‘check the rope is tied at both ends carefully before you start,
425don’t tip your pole over too far to one side.’ They make use of and can to a
greater or lesser extent consciously talk about this knowledge in relation to their
practice (knowledge that cannot easily be put in to language yet is one, but only
one way of conceptualizing what tacit knowledge is). In Bionion terms, this does
 not disappear when the tightrope walker is on the rope, rather it is made use of
430unconsciously as a pre-conception which is then saturated by the actual experi-
ence of that particular tight rope experience. From this perspective, theoretical
and tacit knowledge are tightly intertwined in dialectic tension, so tightly that
they almost merge. Not the merging of a socio-cultural interpretation of Schön,
and not quite the stark separation of theory and practice that cognitive interpreta-
435tions imply either, but rather a different epistemology where theories remain free
and flexible, both general and specific, and where they are continually adjusted
(the dialectic) to the moment to moment experience.
In the classroom, teachers too often have the experience of ‘being in the
zone’. In fact, it is precisely when they have 30 children all vying for attention at
440once that they could be typified as demonstrating ‘Reflection-in-action’. Their
(extensive) body of knowledge – about behaviour management, about teaching
techniques, about approaches to teaching maths, about how to model column
addition, is not at the forefront of their conscious minds. Teachers do not have
the luxury of taking 10 seconds in the midst of a classroom exchange to think
445about what they will say or do. Often they need to make decisions and react to
events instantaneously, ‘in the moment’. Similarly to the rope walker, their
knowledge about teaching does not disappear, it is made use of unconsciously
as a pre-conception, which is then saturated by the actual experience of that
particular teaching experience to create a saturated formation, a thought trans-
450lated in to action, that is the decision to choose a particular teaching strategy in a
particular moment. We might modify Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action,
when viewed through the lens of Bion’s ideas, so that it becomes intersubjective
reflection-in-action, where the premature for certainty is pushed in to the back-
ground, to allow the ‘selected fact’ to emerge from the matrix of knowledge,
455predicated on a dialectic view of theoretical and experiential knowledge.
Importantly, the tension, or perhaps better dialectic, between the two types of
knowledge, the productive use of uncertainty, is what leads to really knowing
about the other.
For Bion, knowledge about the analysand (or the child) arises first from
460intersubjective communication, mediated through the transformation of O. When
PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES ON REFLECTION IN ACTION 11
focusing on implicit and explicit knowledge, the key move is from pre-
conception to conception – an unsaturated state of mind meets with a negative
realization (this does not quite fit, this does not quite work), and if the uncer-
tainty can be tolerated, and a flight into anxiety avoided, it is possible for a
465conception to arise. This move from pre-conception to conception is essentially
experiential – it involves the analyst being in direct unconscious emotional
communication with the analysand. It is inherently implicit, and is not based
directly on reference to a set of theoretical knowledge. When conceptions
become saturated, the analyst (or the teacher) may engage in the abstraction of
470conceptions into more advanced constructions of thoughts. This construction of
thoughts is, for Bion, based on noticing similarities between phenomena, and
developing links between them.
In the consulting room, the analyst uses his cognitive function, in collabora-
tion with the analysand, to explore the meaning of the shared intersubjective
475communications they are engaged in (the emerging conceptions). This process of
abstraction does not happen in a vacuum, however, but rather the analyst makes
connections to an existing body of psychoanalytical theories – a body of profes-
sional knowledge. It is, however, a circular iterative (or dialectic) process – the
use of the cognitive comparative functions – attention, research and action, is
480bounded by the need to realize that any arising conception must inevitably have a
new unsaturated component. So the arising system of knowledge, or theoretical
framework, still has to be grounded in the on going intersubjective relationship.
The analyst needs to keep checking back, on an intersubjective level, that the
abstractions that they have made still correspond with the experience they are
485having with the analysand. Bion’s epistemology proposes that any theory needs
to be connected to the intersubjective experience of the professional and the
client. The professional, just as with the analyst, must get to know the client, and
use theory in a way that remains true to that intersubjective experience.
Furthermore, they must also build a new theory about that client that again
490remains true to that same intersubjective experience. This is where uncertainty
is productive and where the premature desire for certainty is unproductive.
Bion’s epistemology directs the analyst to first hold ‘in the moment’, in
Schön’s moment, for long enough for the intersubjective knowledge of the
other, intertwined with but not subservient to theoretical knowledge, to come
495through the unconscious to the surface. My contention is that this model of
thinking has something of value for teachers, particularly in their work with
children with SEN, an area replete with theoretical models.
This cognitive/emotional view of praxis is also unashamedly idealist, follow-
ing Kant in viewing people as autonomous choosing unitary subjects. It is not a
500return to the religious metaphysics of Kant, undone in its surface form, as Ward
(2006)AQ8 amongst many implies, by the discoveries of evolutionary biology. Rather
Bion echoes the concerns of troubled naturalists such as Fodor (2007) and Furedi
(2004), as to how we can properly account for the emergent properties of
consciousness. In contrast to sociocultural interpretations of Schön, the unity of
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505the subject is championed; indeed in the framework of productive uncertainty, it
is by coming in true (albeit always partial) emotional contact with this unitary
analysand, that the analyst can come to truly meet their needs. True, this could be
conceived as an unconscious process, but not one based on an unconscious as
Lacan or Derrida view it where there is no true identity at the end of traces or
510signifiers. Rather it is Bion’s rather grander view, closer to Freud’s original
conceptualization of psychoanalysis as a route to empower the patient, of a
meeting of minds through unconscious to unconscious communication, the
waking dream which is the royal road to coming closer to knowing the
individual.
5159. IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS
Productive uncertainty implies a particular position on agency, and this can be
applied at the level of the analyst and the patient (or analysand), and potentially
by extension, to the teacher and the child. For the professional, the existence of a
productive uncertainty which sits between rules and performance must on the
520face of it be predicated on an ‘I’ that chooses, that moves from uncertainty to
decision. For the child, or the teacher-child dyad, if knowledge arises from
intersubjective relationship, this implies two agentic subjects, for otherwise
what is it knowledge of? Just as Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ encounter (Buber, 1956) is
predicated on a knowing mind with intrinsic value encountering another of
525intrinsic value, Bion’s focus on the intersubjective relationship implies a similar
encounter of knowing, relating minds. Bion’s philosophy could be considered as
‘I relate, therefore I am’ (Andrew Cooper, personal communication). I see Bion’s
account of thinking as an agentic account of both the analyst and the analysand,
and as such is explicitly in to contention with determinist accounts of the human
530subject, particularly in terms of their relevance for how we think about working
with children with SENs .
Deterministic accounts arising from the Enlightenment, spanning Comte,
Spinoza, Marx, Freud, and Darwin can be seen as having devalued the currency
of the idea of a freely choosing agentic subject whose future is at least to a
535significant degree undetermined, by genes or by social background.
As Jonathan Sacks writes, ‘what makes human action free is that it is future
orientated […] freedom is written in the future tense’ (2007, p. 59). What
profession could be more future orientated than teaching? Whatever view you
take of the purposes of education, it has to have something to do with creating
540the future through the development of the child. Deterministic accounts of
human nature, which sometimes interpenetrate with public policy, also tend
towards the specification of tightly defined sets of rules about professional
practice. This is particularly true in relation to the work of teachers with children
with  SENs . Psychiatry and cognitive psychology, clear products of the
545Enlightenment, in applying a scientific lens to the human subject, tend towards
the specification of rules and procedures for particular diagnostic categories. Of
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course, sociological critiques of the role of psychology in special education,
based to significant extent on Foucault, such as Henriques et al. (1988) and
Barton (1988), have highlighted the dangers of scientism in this application of
550psychology, although, of course, such critiques are themselves predicated on
another sort of deterministic account about human action.
The dangers of determinism could be considered to have increased in recent
decades with the rise in the influence of evolutionary psychology and neu-
roscience influenced by genetics on education. Exaggeration notwithstanding,
555if the teacher sees the child as an agglomeration of genes, of which some are
‘faulty’, and it is the phenotypic expression of these which determine both their
present capacities and future abilities, it is not a very large step in to the allure of
a set of scientifically derived procedures for dealing with this particular pheno-
type. The influence of such a mindset on all teachers, but particularly in the
560context of working with children with SEN, even if only partial, will tend to
further reduce the space available between the rules and the performance where
productive uncertainty based on intersubjective relationship between agentic
subjects could also lead to the derivation of a valuable type of knowledge. As
an example, in the case of my encounter with Avi, I might have grasped for a
565theoretical construct about Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder, rather
than staying with him ‘in the moment’.
Clearly, there are indeed elements of exaggeration in my account, and it
should not be taken to suggest that I am embarking on an anti-Enlightenment,
anti-scientific enterprise, nor one that ignores the legitimate and complex debates
570about accounts of consciousness and free will in metaphysical naturalism, as well
as the nature of agency going back to Kant. There is also more that could be said
about the relationship between determinism and agency, although I think it is
clear that in my interpretation of Bion, particularly bearing in mind the stark
influence of Kant on this thinking, I am setting out an incompatibilist libertarian
575view, which follows Ginet (2015) in viewing free human decisions as being
essentially uncaused. From this perspective, I am arguing that Bion’s relational
perspective bolsters the case against compatibilist positions on determinism such
as those of Dennett or Kane, which even Ginet admits that due to advances in
neuroscience are in the ascendancy.
580Yet being a libertarian is not in conflict with recognising that psychology,
neuroscience and even evolutionary biology have much to tell us about how
children, including children like Avi, learn in ways that can productively inform
the practice of teaching. Bion’s epistemology has the use, development and
application of theory at its centre. The question which Bion’s thinking highlights
585is how professionals make use of theories in practice now, and how they should
make use of them in the future. This is of particular relevance to the work of
teachers with children with SEN, where theoretical knowledge about diagnostic
categories holds such promise and such danger.
Bion’s powerful ideas point towards the need for teachers working with
590children with SEN to develop a model of professional practice that has the
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struggle with uncertainty at its centre. Bion’s epistemology suggests that teachers
will make the best use of theoretical (or scientific) knowledge related to diag-
nostic categories if they do so in a context where they recognize the paramount
importance for them as caring professionals to genuinely engage in the difficult,
595uncertain but ultimately so productive emotional encounter with the real human
others that inhabit their classrooms.
This argument may, to some, seem glib or obvious. Surely, you will say,
teachers know this already. Is it not the case that doctors and nurses and social
workers also know it, even if they do not always succeed in putting it in to
600practice? In answering this not unreasonable question, I refer to Furedi’s (2004)
writing about the wider medicalization of social experience,
My objection to the contemporary representation of the vulnerable self is based on
the conviction that it disempowers people and distracts them from gaining a
measure of control over their lives. Through cultivating a powerful sense of
605vulnerability, it undermines subjectivity and the sense of human agency. The
continuous transmission of cultural signals that suggest that in an ever expanding
range of circumstances people should not be expected to cope encourages the
professionalization of everyday life.
(Furedi, 2004, p. 414)
610It is here that the instrumentalization of teaching, and of the caring profes-
sions, poses a risk, a risk to the professionals themselves, in terms of a deadening
of their professional identity, but more crucially a risk to the children and adults
that they work with. Their sense of themselves as agents, is placed at risk in a
general culture where, as Furedi has identified, determinism based on genes, or
615determinism based on how your parents live, or a determinism based on what
category box you are in (whether you have Autism or Attention Deficit Disorder,
or Dyslexia…), undermines the possibility, in Bion’s words, of truly ‘becoming’.
None of this, of course, is meant to belittle the need for caring professionals or
their role in society. As Furedi notes, ‘[…] there was a time when enlightened…
620professionals were critical of the tendency to medicalize human experience’ (op.
cit., p. 415). Well, there still are some voices that heed this call, but they are in
danger of being drowned out in the  twenty-first century. This is why Bion’s
perspective on professional practice is so important. His work’s call to the
teacher is to be critical of the tendency to make your children a category, to
625ignore the true human other across from you, to use theory and category too early
and avoid the difficulty of contending with the uncertain, agentic other. Teachers
who heed this call will, I contend, by following in the path laid by Bion’s
emotional epistemology, hold on to the possibility of uncovering the possibilities
that their children possess. This is particularly, but by no means exclusively,
630relevant to children with SENs . Such openness to possibility denoted by the idea
of productive uncertainty also has application both across the curriculum for
teachers, and by extension to other caring professions. The dangers of a deter-
minist worldview when applied to professional practice are particularly acute
PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES ON REFLECTION IN ACTION 15
when public policy serves to instrumentalize these professions. This same con-
635cern is at the root of Schön’s project, when he highlights the flaws in a technical
rational model of the professions. For the caring professions, particularly when in
public (unconscious) imagination they both hold the responsibility for the ills of
the world, and the certain solution to them as laid down by government in its role
as custodian of scientific rationality, there is also significant danger of de-
640professionalization in which policy directives and classroom prescription aim
to reduce the space for teacher thinking, to make teaching not a craft, not a
profession, but a technician’s role.
Bion’s thinking provides, I feel, some counterweight to societal policy trends
which lose sight of the crucial role of the teacher’s relationship with the child in
645coming to know their needs, and promoting their agentic development. My
central objective has been to introduce the idea of productive uncertainty,
where tolerating the difficulty of not knowing, can ultimately lead to a better,
more nuanced, more flexible understanding of the human other across from you.
This is particularly relevant for teachers working with children with SENs , but
650also to all those others, doctors, nurses, social workers, who also need to hold off
from the flight in to premature certainty when working with their patients and
clients that Bion so importantly warns us against.
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